This case shows a limit to this type of governance that allows individuals to have a greater voting power than others. I didn’t follow the whole thing but I guess it was designed to prevent a dishonest person to change the outcome of a vote by creating many accounts.

Regarding ONC, we need to quickly determine what type of governance we want to put in place;

  • Do we want to allows individuals with a greater voting power? If yes, we have to create rules which prevent an individual to obtain a strong voting power through a method that is judged unfair by the community. I think the community would react better if an individual becomes a whale thanks to his engagement in the network/community.
  • Should we continue with our voting system 1 account = 1 vote? If yes, how can we prevent attacks with fake accounts?

Reddit EthTraders is also an interesting case with their donuts has a means of voting.


@ro5s Is the idea to award only 1 ONCC per member? Seems the best way to start out, but I’m also curious how it would play out if those who make substantial contributions are awarded additional ONCCs.


Good article to share! Aragon’s second network vote was indeed a fairly useful study on what happens with voter apathy and opportunistic whales.

I don’t think we’re at the stage where we necessarily need to worry about this, though always good to chart out solutions …

(1) I think 1:1 voting makes sense for ONC Coop. DAO for now. It is largely concerned with bounty awards and it feels right for everyone that signs onto Mission to have equal voice here, to start.

(2) It would be useful to reward active voting and other contributions to ONC with more governance power over ONC Coop. DAO. In addition to engagement benefit, this would help act as basic ‘anti-whale’ measure since folks will be incentivized to ‘show up’ and vote in order to earn more contribution credit, power.

So, to test this, we should keep an active ledger on Github and on this Forum to mark contributions. To start, we might credit BUILD tokens to ONC governance cc: @nebali

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As for locking in indentity and reducing risk of spam accounts accruing undue influence over onchain governance … we could look at uport, 3box?

I just don’t want us to lose time building out membership over this concern. I believe we will be effective as we iterate (acknowledging these risks :muscle:)


To add, this is a good model to follow as we build out ONC governance tooling: https://github.com/aragoncoop


I’m way late to this party but…

Whaleocracy is definitely an ongoing problem in blockchain governance, not to mention in lots of aspects of human-on-human governance. Somebody somewhere (honestly can’t remember who) once said that money is tokenized power, which I think happens in part because it’s the most universal and theoretically objective scorekeeping system that’s available. Interesting to at least explore other, more subjective ways of allocating influence.

I’m pretty opposed to requiring people to connect their online identities to their real-world ones for every damn thing. Adding the extra layer of a reputation-via-participation system (which is essentially what’s proposed for ONC in the combination of forum + DAO) is an interesting way to mitigate the problem without requiring people to doxx themselves, although I think it needs serious thought to understand potential attack vectors at scale.

Granted, this leaves it open for a person to create multiple accounts and comment in useful ways from all of them…but I’m much less bothered by an individual getting an extra vote or two by way of multiple identities if voting rights are assigned to an account based on useful participation rather than financial stake. If somebody adds enough utility that they’re able to pass as 2 people, then I’m honestly not that fussed if they vote twice :stuck_out_tongue:

Which I guess would make it sort of a…utilitocracy?